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Abstract
This study aims to determine the effect of the Massachusetts Health Care
Reform on household health care expenditures. I follow the consumer choice
theoretical framework, which says that a change in the price of health care will
cause households to adjust their consumption choices based on their preferences.
Using data from the Consumer Expenditure Survey, I apply a difference-indifference technique to isolate the effect of the reform on spending on health care,
prescription drugs, and health insurance as a share of total household expenditures.
The results are not statistically significant. However, using a difference-indifference-in-differences estimation to determine the effect of the reform
specifically on minorities, I find positive and significant results, which suggests that
minorities spent a higher share of their budget on health after the reform. These
findings require additional research to better understand how health care reform
can affect household spending on health care.
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I.

Introduction

Over the last two decades the United States has experienced dramatic
increases in health care expenditures. Simultaneously, we have also seen a widening
gap in access to care as well as disparities in quality of care. While generally
acknowledged as a rising problem, states had done little to combat the problems
until Massachusetts enacted a major health care reform law in 2006.
This paper aims to use the Massachusetts experiment to perform an
empirical analysis of the effect of health care reform laws on health spending. This
type of research is valuable to policymakers on both the state and federal level.
Massachusetts served as the basis for the Affordable Care Act (ACA) and impacts
within the state have the potential to predict the effects of the ACA. Understanding
the specific ways the reform affected household expenditure patterns will also help
improve future legislation. In this paper, I investigate the question: How did the
Massachusetts Health Care Reform of 2006 affect household expenditures on
health?
In Section II, I will summarize the Massachusetts Health Care Reform. Next,
Section III provides a review of the literature surrounding the topic. Section IV
provides the theoretical framework and Section V discusses the data and summary
statistics. Section VI explains the empirical model I use in my analysis. I conclude in
Section VII with a summary of my findings and recommendations for further
research.
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II.

Background

The Massachusetts Health Care Reform, also known as Chapter 58, was
passed in April of 2006 by the Massachusetts Legislature. The premise of the Reform
was to improve access to health care and health insurance as well as decrease costs
to individuals by restructuring both Massachusetts’ Medicaid program (MassHealth)
and the private insurance market and by creating two new health insurance
programs: the subsidized CommonwealthCare (CommCare) and the unsubsidized
CommonwealthChoice (CommChoice).
One of the main parts of Chapter 58 was the establishment of an individual
mandate. This required all Massachusetts residents over the age of 18 to purchase
credible health insurance, given there is an affordable plan available to them.
Affordability was determined as a maximum amount an individual must pay for
health insurance. The affordability schedule was progressive and set as a percentage
of income, where those below 150 percent of the federal poverty line were
considered not to be able to afford any plan and those above 500 percent of the
federal poverty line were considered to be able to afford any plan. The credibility
component of the mandate established the minimum creditable coverage a plan
must offer. This included offering “comprehensive health benefits” including
prescription drugs, no annual or per-sickness benefit maximums, no fee schedules
for indemnity benefits, limits on deductibles, and maximums on in-network out-ofpocket spending. To ensure adherence to the individual mandate, Chapter 58
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created penalties through state income taxes. In 2007, the penalty was $219 for an
individual and in 2008 the maximum penalty was $912 for an individual
(McDonough et al., 2008).
The reforms to MassHealth included expanding coverage eligibility and
benefits available (dental care and glasses), particularly for children. Child eligibility
for MassHealth was increased to 200-300 percent of the federal poverty line. To
address the issue of the large number of eligible but not enrolled individuals, the
Reform streamlined the application process, increased community outreach, and
used the individual mandate. Previously, eligible but un-enrolled individuals relied
heavily on hospital charity programs, however, the reform placed restrictions on the
availability of reimbursements for hospitals. Physicians and hospitals also received
higher payment rates for MassHealth care, conditional on pay-for-performance
standards (McDonough et al., 2008).
Chapter 58 increased access to insurance and care for people that were
ineligible for MassHealth but could not afford insurance in the private market by
establishing CommonwealthCare. Uninsured adults under 150 percent of the federal
poverty line were eligible for a health insurance plan with no premiums, no
deductibles, and low copays. Those with incomes between 151 and 300 percent of
the federal poverty line were eligible for plans with sliding-scale premiums and
copays and no deductibles (McDonough et al., 2008).
CommonwealthChoice was created for individuals who were ineligible for
CommCare but who did not have access to health insurance through an employer.
These plans were available through the Connector but were private insurance plans.
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The four different plans (Gold, Silver, Bronze, and Young Adult) varied in the
amount of cost sharing between the insurer and individual (cost sharing increased
as premiums decreased) (McDonough et al., 2008).
Chapter 58 also included reforms to regulations in the private insurance
markets in Massachusetts. The main change was a merger of the small-group
market and the individual market. This allowed individuals to purchase any of the
plans that were available to small groups (employees in small firms). Lumping the
groups together decreased the ratings and premiums for individual coverage but
was expected to slightly increase the ratings and premiums for the small group
coverage. Chapter 58 imposed new regulations on the private market including
medical underwriting prohibition, pre-existing condition limitations, and
guaranteed issue and renewal. Insurers were also required to cover dependent
children until they turned 26 or for two years after they lost their dependent status
(McDonough et al., 2008).
Private insurance market reforms were supplemented by new regulations on
employers. Employers were required to make a “fair and reasonable” contribution
to the health insurance costs of their employees. In addition, employers were
required to allow all eligible full time employees to buy any of the health insurance
plans offered by the employer and they were prohibited from paying a larger
percentage of the premiums for higher paid employees. The Massachusetts Health
Care Reform enabled previously uninsured and underinsured individuals to obtain
health insurance and access to care. As of April 2008, 355,000 previously uninsured
individuals gained health insurance coverage; 177,000 through CommCare, 55,000
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through MassHealth, and 123,000 through private insurance (McDonough et al.,
2008).

III.

Literature Review

The Massachusetts Health Care Reform of 2006 has been studied extensively
in the literature. However, most studies focus on the changes in insurance coverage,
expected costs for health care, and changes in access to care. This paper takes an
approach that combines the above research and examines the effect of the reform
on actual consumer expenditures on health care.
The literature does not dispute that the number of insured individuals in
Massachusetts has increased as a result of the reform and its mandate. Long et al.
(2012) find that insurance coverage increased from 86.6% in 2006 to 94.2% in
2010. Of the newly insured individuals, approximately 25% enrolled in private
insurance, 41% in CommCare, and 34% in Medicaid/MassHealth (Nardin et al.,
2011). One of the largest drops in the uninsured population was amongst young
adults who went from 21.1% uninsured in 2005-2006 to 8.2% in 2007-2008 (Long
et al., 2010). Additionally, Long and Stockley (2010) find that despite the national
recession, there was no significant change in the percentage insured in
Massachusetts and instead only a slight shift in the type of coverage. They find that
although most other states experienced an increase in the number of uninsured,
Massachusetts saw a decrease in individuals with employer-sponsored insurance
paired with a similar increase in individuals with public insurance.
6

Another focus of the literature surrounding insurance coverage is about the
characteristics of the newly insured and still uninsured. One of the goals of the
reform was to decrease insurance coverage disparities. Maxwell et al. (2011) find
that the increase in coverage due to the reform among Hispanics was double that of
the non-Hispanic white increase. Additionally, as of 2009, the individuals that were
most likely to be uninsured were healthy young single males (Long and Stockley,
2010).
The literature is less clear about the expected costs for health care as a result
of the reform. Decreasing costs as well as the financial burden of health care was a
primary goal of the reform, however, the issue is complicated by the variety of
different costs associated with health care. In terms of macro level health care costs,
Miller (2012) as well as Long et al. (2012) find that the reform decreased emergency
room usage (especially in non-emergency cases) in Massachusetts between 5 and
8% while emergency room usage was increasing on a national level.
Given the individual mandate, one health care expense for individuals is
insurance premiums. Steinbrook (2008), and Hackmann et al. (2013) both find that
due to the merger of the individual and small-group insurance markets, premiums
for individuals have decreased. Hackmann et al. (2013) also find that after the
reform, there were smaller mark-ups on individual coverage premiums by about
$107 per person. However, according to Cogan et al. (2010), this decrease has come
with possible consequences for the private insurance market including an increase
in single-coverage employer sponsored insurance premiums by about 6% or, on
average $262.
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Another source of financial burden comes from out-of-pocket spending on
health care. Long and Stockley (2010) and Steinbrook (2008) both find relative
decreases in out-of-pocket spending within the first years of the reform in
Massachusetts. Specifically, Long et al. (2012) find that in 2006, 9.8% of individuals
had out-of-pocket spending that was greater than 10% of their income, however, by
2010, this had decreased to 6.1%. New enrollees in the subsidized CommCare saw
their average monthly health care spending decrease from $518 pre-reform, to $454
in the phase in period, to $356 post-reform (Chandra et al., 2011). Additionally, outof-pocket spending such as average annual hospital costs for insured individuals
decreased by $124 (Hackmann et al., 2012).
Studies of the reform have also found evidence of the presence of adverse
selection in the insurance market. Hackmann et al. (2012) finds that counties in
Massachusetts that had greater increases in insurance coverage saw smaller
increases in average cost per insured resident, implying that as the number of
insured increased, average costs did not increase as quickly. In sum, previous
literature suggests that there has been an overall decrease in the costs of health care
due to the reform; however, the micro level effects of costs and spending have not
been determined.
The third focus of the literature is on access to care post-reform. Research
has found that access to care as well as the likelihood of having a usual source of
care has increased (Long et al., 2012; Long and Stockley, 2010). Although they also
find that there is an increased amount of unmet need in 2010 as compared to 2009,
less of it is due to cost barriers. However, Zhu et al. (2010) find no difference in
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access to care due to the reform and Maxwell et al. (2011) find that despite a
decrease in the disparities in access to care, they are still an issue.
I extend the literature by conducting an empirical analysis with more recent
data from the Consumer Expenditure Survey. While previous studies have examined
specific effects of the reform on insurance coverage, cost of care, and access to care,
I look at the effect of the reform on the ways households allocate their budget
towards health care.

IV.

Theory

To understand how consumers make decisions about the amount of health
care they consume, I use consumer choice theory. The basis of consumer choice
theory is the assumption that consumers will behave such that they maximize their
utility subject to their budget constraint. This optimization behavior can be
determined by deriving the consumer’s demand for the specific goods
compromising their utility function.
I assume a consumer has two goods, denoted here as X and Y, with prices of
PX and PY. The consumer has a utility function taking the form,
(

)

(

)

(4. 1)

The consumer’s budget constraint is
(4. 2)
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The Langrangian Multiplier method is used to maximize the consumer’s utility
subject to their budget constraint:
(

)

(

)

(4. 3)

The Langrangian of this problem is therefore
(

)

(

)

(4. 4)

The resulting first-order conditions are

(4. 5)

The first-order conditions can be rewritten as

(4. 6)

The first two first-order conditions show that the optimum marginal rate of
substitution (MRS) between X and Y is equal to the ratio of the prices:
⁄

(4. 7)

Solving the system of equations of the first-order conditions results in the following
functions:
(
(

)
)

(4. 8)
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(

)

Therefore, the demands for X and Y are functions of the price of X, the price of Y, and
income.
Demand functions show how a consumer will change their behavior due to a
change in income or the price of the good. However, the consumer’s change in
behavior is composed of both an income effect and a substitution effect. The income
effect describes the change in the quantity demanded with the relative price of the
good held constant but the level of utility changing and the substitution effect
describes the change in the quantity demanded with the level of utility fixed. The
total change in demand for good X,

, can be written as
( )(

)

(4. 9)

(4.9) shows the total change in X from a one unit change in the price of X.
Differentiating the budget constraint (4.2) with respect to the price of X shows that
( )

(4. 10)

Plugging (4.10) into (4.9) gives
(

)

(4. 11)

(4.11) is the Slutsky equation and shows the change in quantity demanded of X
broken down into the substitution effect and the income effect. The first term is the
substitution effect, showing the change with the fixed level of utility. The second
term is the income effect, showing the change with the relative price of X held
constant.
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The next step in determining the spending patterns of households is to look
at the price change. I assume that there are two goods—health care and all other
goods—and that the households experience a change in the price of health care as a
result of the reform. I will also assume that the price of health decreases postreform. I make this assumption for several reasons. First, the literature about the
Massachusetts reform has found that insurance premiums, out-of-pocket spending,
and health costs in general have decreased (Chandra et al., 2011; Hackmann et al.,
2013; Long and Stockley, 2010; and Steinbrook, 2008). Secondly, two main parts of
the reform were the expansion of Medicaid benefits and eligibility as well as the
introduction of new subsidized insurance programs. Both of these programs aim to
decrease the amount that their recipients spend out-of-pocket on health care.
As the Slutsky equation described above shows, changes in demand are
composed of both an income effect and a substitution effect. Normal goods, or goods
where the quantity demanded increases as income increases, have a negative
income effect whereas inferior goods, where the quantity demanded decreases as
the income increases, have a positive income effect.
The substitution effect depends on whether the two goods are substitutes or
complements. If the goods are substitutes, meaning that as a price of health
decreases the quantity demanded of all other goods decreases, the substitution
effect will be positive. If the goods are complements, meaning that as the price of
health decreases the quantity demanded of all other goods increases, the
substitution effect will be negative.
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Studies have generally shown that health is a normal good because it is both
income and price inelastic, which implies that as the price of health decreases or
income increases, quantity demanded of health increases (Ringel, 2002). I therefore
assume that health is a normal good and that the income effect is positive.
Below, I show graphically how the quantity demanded of all other goods
could change as a result of a decrease in the price of health. The first scenario is if
the income effect outweighs the substitution effect. This scenario implies the goods
are complements and results in an increase in the quantity of all other goods.

The second scenario is if the substitution effect outweighs the income effect. As seen
in the figure below, this results in a decrease in the quantity demanded of all other
goods, implying the two goods are substitutes.
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While the consumer choice theory described above guides my analysis, price
and quantity data are not currently publically available. In the next sections, I
further describe the data and empirical model I use in place of calculating demand
functions.

V.

Data and Summary Statistics

Experimental Design
The gold standard for program evaluation research is the Randomized
Controlled Trial (RCT). An RCT involves randomly placing participants into
treatment and control groups to minimize any bias and allows for direct observation
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of the effect of the treatment. However, RCTs are both expensive and in the case of
this research, logistically unfeasible due to the fact that the reform has already been
implemented. I must therefore use a quasi-experimental design. The difference
between this and the RCT is that participants are not randomly assigned to the
treatment or control group. Quasi-experimental methods can take advantage of
natural experiments, such as the reform in Massachusetts, that apply a treatment to
one group but not another. In a natural experiment, the treatment and control
groups are determined by an outside force but can provide observational data that
simulates an RCT.
The next best method to determine the affect of the reform on household
health spending would be to calculate the demand for health care as seen in the
theory detailed in section IV. However, the demand function calculations require
data on the prices and quantities of health care that each household faces and these
data are not currently publically available.
I therefore use a quasi-experimental difference-in-differences (DD)
technique, detailed in section VI, which finds the effect of a treatment by comparing
the differences in the treatment group over time with the differences in the control
group over time. The DD method calls for an outcome variable as well as
explanatory variables, including a treatment designation variable and time variable.

Expenditures and Budget Shares
The main data source used in this paper is the Consumer Expenditure Survey
(CEX) from the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). The CEX is a two-part
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survey of a sample of households across the country that collects information about
the expenditures, income, and demographics of households. The CEX has two parts,
the quarterly interview and a weekly diary. The data are broken down into
Consumer Units (CUs) and the data are collected from a reference person within the
household. For the purposes of this paper, I use the quarterly interview data,
specifically the data from the Consumer Unit Characteristics and Income files
(FMLI), which contains information about CU characteristics, income, and
expenditures. The Interview Survey of the CEX is considered to be a rotating panel
because CUs provide 4 quarters worth of data but the reference periods and months
within each quarter for each CU can be different.
The Consumer Expenditure Survey defines ten main groups of goods: food,
alcoholic beverages, housing, apparel and services, transportation, health care,
entertainment, personal care, cash contributions, and personal insurance and
pensions. Each main group is divided into sub-groups where the summation of the
sub-good expenditures is equal to the group expenditures, which in turn sum to the
CU’s total expenditure.
In this study, I investigate the effects of the healthcare reform on three
outcome variables: budget share of total heath expenditures, budget share of health
insurance expenditures, and budget share of prescription drugs. I calculate budget
shares for each consumer unit by dividing the CU’s expenditure on the group by
their total expenditure. I calculate the budget shares of the two sub-groups of health,
health insurance and prescription drugs, as a share of total expenditures and not
just as a share of expenditures on health care.
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Treatment and Control Group
The difference-in-differences method requires a treatment group as well as a
control group. The treatment group is CUs that reside in Massachusetts and have
therefore received the treatment of health care reform. I separate out the CUs
located in Massachusetts from the national sample based on the state codes
provided.1 The number of observations in each year (2004-2010) ranges from 424
CUs in 2008 to 524 CUs in 2004 with a total of 3,312 CUs over the entire time
period.
The control group represents the counterfactual, or, what would have
happened in the treatment group without the treatment. Therefore, the control
group should be as similar as possible to the treatment group in the initial time
period. Previous studies have used New York as a control group for Massachusetts
(Long et al., 2010 and Long and Stockley, 2011). Based off of this, I perform
statistical tests to decide if New York is an appropriate control, discussed in more
detail below. I also investigate the suitability of Maryland as a potential control
state. I determine similarity by looking at total expenditures, expenditures on
health, health insurance, and prescription drugs, as well as certain demographic
characteristics. I use a t-test to determine whether these variables are statistically
significantly different across the control and treatment groups. The null hypothesis
of the t-test is that the two groups are not different. Therefore, for the control group
to be similar to the treatment group, the t-test should result in t-statistics that are
1

Massachusetts state codes are not suppressed in any year of the CEX data.
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not statistically significant. The results of the t-tests are shown in Table 2. I find that
the two groups are not significantly different in terms of total expenditures, health
expenditures, prescription drug expenditures, poverty, and homeownership. I
therefore use the CUs in New York and Maryland as a control for the CUs in
Massachusetts.
I then separate out the CUs in New York and Maryland from the national
sample.2 From 2004-2010, there are 7,571 total CUs sampled in New York with a
range of 879 in 2005 to 1,169 in 2004. From 2004-2010, there are 3,065 total CUs
sampled in Maryland with a range of 373 in 2008 to 636 in 2004.
I create a binary indicator variable to designate if the CU is in the treatment
or control group and also divide the data into two time periods. The pre-reform
period is defined as the years 2004 – 2006 and the post-reform period is defined as
the years 2007-2010. Even though the law was passed in 2006, I do not begin the
post-reform period until 2007 to more accurately reflect the actual
implementation.3
Table 1 shows summary statistics for expenditures and budget shares of the
three outcome variables in the treatment and control groups in both the pre-reform
and post-reform time periods.4 Figures 1 through 3 show the mean expenditures on

New York state codes have been suppressed for some sampled CUs in the state.
Maryland state codes may either have some observations that have been re-coded
or a least one stratum of observations include re-codes from other states. However,
there is no method for determining which CUs may be re-codes from other states.
3 The actual implementation of the reform did not happen immediately. The reform
was rolled out in incremental stages.
4 I omit CUs with negative values for health expenditures, health insurance
expenditures, and prescription drug expenditures from the sample.
2
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health, health insurance, and prescription drugs in the treatment and control groups
from 2004 through 2010.

Demographics
In order to control for characteristics other than the reform that might affect
a CU’s expenditures I include several demographic variables. Demographic data for
each CU are collected from the CEX FMLI file. The demographic variables include
those that describe the CU as a whole and those that are specific to the reference
person. CU demographics of interest include income, race, education, age, family
type, and housing type. Controlling for these variables is important because it
ensures that any effect they have on health expenditures is not misclassified as a
result of the treatment.
Based on the data in the CEX, I create binary variables for the demographic
variables of interest. From the income data I create the variable underFPL to
indicate whether the CU falls below 150% of the federal poverty line (FPL) for their
family size in the interview year. Next I create a binary variable to indicate if the CU
is a minority or not (minority). Minority CUs include those coded as Black, Hispanic,
Native American, Asian, Pacific Islander, and Multi-race. Non-minority CUs are those
coded as White. Educational attainment is defined by whether the reference person
completed college or not (collegeGrad). The variable elderly indicates whether the
reference person is above 65 years old. I condense the family type variable into a CU
with or without children (children) and the housing type variable into owns home or
not (ownHome).
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Table 1 shows summary statistics for the demographic variables in the
treatment and control groups in both the pre-reform and post-reform time periods.

VI.

Empirical Model

The empirical models that I use in this paper are the difference-in-differences
as well as the difference-in-difference-in-differences estimation models. I use this
quasi-experimental design because it is the next best option given that a
Randomized Controlled Trial (RCT) is not possible, as discussed above.

Difference-in-differences (DD)
The difference-in-difference estimation method is based on Ashenfelter and
Card (1985). The concept behind the technique is that a treatment effect can be
calculated without bias by looking at the difference in the differences in the
treatment group before and after the treatment as well the differences between the
control group before and after the treatment. This helps to control for consistent
and inherent differences between the control group and the treatment group
(Imbens and Wooldridge, 2007).
The general model of a difference-in-difference estimation is:
(6. 1)
where
: outcome variable,
: treatment dummy,
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: time period dummy.

The coefficients in this estimation are interpreted as:
: difference between treatment and control groups before
treatment,
: difference between the pre and post treatment periods in
treatment group,
: treatment effect.
The treatment effect,

, can also be defined as:
(

)

(

)

(6. 2)

where
: outcome of treatment group in period 2,
: outcome of treatment group in period 1,
: outcome of control group in period 2,
: outcome of control group in period 1.
Therefore,

measures the difference in difference between the time periods in the

treatment group and the difference between the time periods in the control group.
is an unbiased estimate of the treatment effect if:
(

)

(

)

(

)

(6. 3)

where
(
(

) : expected treatment effect,
)

: expected overall average effect,
: proportion of total population that is treated.
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Difference-in-difference-in-differences (DDD)
The DDD estimation builds off of the DD estimation by adding in a third
difference in the treatment and control groups. This means that there is a group
and a group

that represents a more specific population of interest. If the

population of interest is ,
and

becomes a treatment group within the treatment group

becomes a control group within the control group. I use a DDD estimation to

determine if there was any extra affect on two specific groups in Massachusetts:
minorities and households under the federal poverty line (minority and underFPL).
Examining the effects on specific populations is important, particularly when the
reform was targeted towards certain groups. One goal of the reform was to decrease
the disparities in access to care among minorities and low-income households.
Finding the extra effect on these two groups can help determine the effectiveness of
the reform on two of its targeted populations.
The general model of a difference-in-difference-in-differences estimation is:

(6. 4)

where
: outcome variable,
: treatment dummy,
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: group of interest dummy,
: time period dummy.
The coefficients in this estimation are interpreted as:
: difference between treatment and control groups before
treatment,
: difference between the group of interest and control before
treatment on average,
: difference between group of interest and control within
treatment group before treatment,
: difference between pre and post treatment on average,
: difference between pre and post treatment in treatment
group,
: difference between pre and post treatment in group of
interest on average,
: treatment effect.
The treatment effect,
(

, can also be defined as:
)

(

)

(

)

(6. 5)

where
: average for group A in treatment group in period 2,
: average for group A in treatment group in period 1,
: average for group A in control group in period 2,
: average for group A in control group in period 2.
: average for group B in treatment group in period 2,
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: average for group B in treatment group in period 1.

Therefore,

measures the effect of the policy on group A in the treatment group.

Estimation Equations
The theory and difference-in-differences estimation model suggest that the
estimation equations are as follows for each outcome variable:
(6. 6)

(6. 7)

The difference-in-difference-in-differences estimation equations for each
outcome variable are:

(6. 8)

(6. 9)

(6. 10)

(6. 11)
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The Appendix lists all estimation equations.

VII.

Analysis

Estimation Issues
I estimate my equations with an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimator.
First I test for multicollinearity in my explanatory variables. I use Variation Inflation
Factors (VIFS) with a cutoff value of 5 to determine if a given explanatory variable is
explained by all of the other explanatory variables. I find that all the tests result in
VIFS of less than 5 and can therefore say that extreme multicollinearity is not a
problem.
I next test for heteroskedasticity in the error terms. OLS assumes the error
terms have a constant variance and are homoscedastic. First I run a Breusch-Pagan
test to describe the extent to which the explanatory variables explain the error term.
The null hypothesis is that the residuals are homoscedastic. All of the BreuschPagan tests result in p-values less than 0.05, which means that we can reject the null
hypothesis and assume the residuals are heterskedastic. I also run a White test for
heteroskedasticity. Again the null hypothesis is that the residuals are
homoscedastic. The results from the White tests were mixed. To correct for the
heteroskedasticity in the data, I use robust standard errors. Even though the White
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test is unclear as to the presence of heteroskedasticity, the data are large so
hypothesis testing will still be accurate with robust standard errors.

Main Results
I run six different specifications for each of the outcome variables, health
expenditures as a share of total expenditures, prescription drug expenditures as a
share of total expenditures, and health insurance expenditures as a share of total
expenditures.

Health Shares:
The regression results for the health share specifications are shown in Table
3. Equations (1) and (2) show the difference-in-differences without and with
demographics, respectively. The interaction between Massachusetts (MA) and time
shows the effect of the law is positive, very small in magnitude, and not statistically
significant in both (1) and (2).
Equations (3) and (4) show the difference-in-difference-in-differences
estimation with the sub group of CUs under the federal poverty line (FPL) without
and with demographics, respectively. The interaction term that shows the effect of
the law on CUs below the FPL is negative and statistically insignificant in both
equations.
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Equations (5) and (6) show the difference-in-difference-in-differences
estimation with the sub group of minority CUs without and with demographics,
respectively. The interaction term that shows the effect of the law on minorities is
positive and statistically significant. The coefficient in (5) says that as a result of the
law, minorities spent 0.0187 percentage points more on their health share as
compared to everyone else. The coefficient in (6) says that the law resulted in
minorities spending 0.0133 percentage points more on their health share.
The demographic variables in equations (2), (3), (4), (5), and (6) are all
statistically significant. The coefficients for CUs who are under the FPL, elderly CUs,
and CUs who own a home are positive. The values show that CUs below the FPL
spend a higher percentage of their total budget on health than those above the FPL,
elderly CUs spend more of their budget on health than non-elderly, and
homeowners spend a higher percentage of their budget on health.
The coefficients for CUs who are minorities, have children, and are college
graduates are all negative. This means that minorities spend a lower share of their
budget on health than white CUs, CUs with children spend a lower share on health
than CUs with children, and college graduates spend a lower share than non-college
graduates.

Health Insurance Shares:
The regression results for the health insurance as a share of total
expenditure specifications are shown in Table 4. Equations (1) and (2) show the
difference-in-differences without and with demographics, respectively. The
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interaction between MA and time that shows the effect of the law is positive in (1)
but negative in (2), very small in magnitude, and not statistically significant in both
(1) and (2).
Equations (3) and (4) show the difference-in-difference-in-differences
estimation with the sub group of CUs under the FPL without and with
demographics, respectively. The interaction term that shows the effect of the law on
CUs below the FPL is negative and statistically insignificant in both equations.
Equations (5) and (6) show the difference-in-difference-in-differences
estimation with the sub group of minority CUs without and with demographics,
respectively. The interaction term that shows the effect of the law on minorities is
positive and statistically significant in (5) but not (6). The coefficient in (5) says that
as a result of the law, minorities spent 0.0116 percentage points more on their
health insurance as a share compared to everyone else. However, because the
treatment effect was not statistically significant when demographics were added
(6), this suggests that the statistical significance in (5) may not be the true effect of
the law.
The demographic variables in (2), (3), (4), (5), and (6) are statistically
significant, except for minority in (6). The coefficients for CUs who are under the
FPL, college graduates, and CUs who own a home are positive. The values show that
CUs below the FPL spend a higher percentage of their total budget on health than
those above the FPL, college graduates spend more of their budget on health than
non-college graduates, and homeowners spend a higher percentage of their budget
on health. The coefficients for CUs who are minorities, have children, and are elderly
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are all negative. This means that minorities spend a lower share of their budget on
health than white CUs, CUs with children spend a lower share on health than CUs
with children, and the elderly spend a lower share of their budget on health than
non-elderly.

Prescription Drug Shares:
The results for the prescription drug regressions are shown in Table 5.
Equations (1) and (2) show the difference-in-differences without and with
demographics, respectively. The interaction between MA and time that shows that
the effect of the law in both (1) and (2) is negative, very small in magnitude, and not
statistically significant.
Equations (3) and (4) show the difference-in-difference-in-differences
estimation with the sub group of CUs under the FPL without and with
demographics, respectively. The interaction term that shows the effect of the law on
CUs below the FPL is positive and statistically insignificant in both equations.
Equations (5) and (6) show the difference-in-difference-in-differences
estimation with the sub group of minority CUs without and with demographics,
respectively. The interaction term that shows the effect of the law on minorities is
positive and statistically significant in (5) and (6). The coefficient say that as a result
of the law, minorities spent 0.00914 (Equation (1)) and 0.00825 (Equation (2))
percentage points more on their health insurance as a share compared to everyone
else.

29

The demographic variables other the owning a home are statistically
significant in (2), (3), (4), (5), and (6). The coefficients for CUs who are under the
FPL or elderly are positive. The values show that CUs below the FPL spend a higher
percentage of their total budget on health than those above the FPL and the elderly
spend a higher percentage of their budget on health than the non-elderly. The
coefficients for CUs who are minorities, have children, and are college graduates are
all negative. This means that minorities spend a lower share of their budget on
health than white CUs, CUs with children spend a lower share on health than CUs
with children, and college graduates spend a lower share of their budget on health
than non-college graduates.

VIII.

Conclusions

The regression results do not provide enough evidence that the
Massachusetts health care reform had a significant effect on the ways households
allocate their spending on health. The difference-in-difference-in-differences
focused on minorities did show some significance in total health shares and
prescription drug shares. The coefficient for the effect of the law was positive in
both cases, which means that the law caused these CUs to spend a higher percentage
of their total budget on health expenses. This could possibly be due to minorities
becoming insured under the new mandate and expansion of coverage eligibility,
therefore bringing their health spending from a negligible amount to a higher
amount. This could be reflected in a higher budget share.
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One limitation of this analysis is that it can be difficult to interpret budget
shares. Calculating budget shares is not the same thing as calculating the quantity
demanded so I cannot say with certainty that the quantities of health, health
insurance, and prescription drugs changed. If the budget share changes, it could be
due to a change in price, quantity, or total expenditures. However, estimating budget
shares can offer some insight into the ways that households change their spending
behavior.
These results raise questions that require future research. The first question
is why did minorities experience a statistically significant treatment effect but
households under the federal poverty line did not? Answering this question would
require a closer look at the differences between the makeup of the minority group
and the low-income group. Another topic that needs to be investigated further is the
actual health outcomes of the CUs. It may be possible that the expenditures on
health for minorities were below the optimal level before the law and the law
increased their expenditures up to a level that is consistent with good health
outcomes. If so, it could be argued that the law had beneficial impacts on minorities.
Overall, future research is needed to fully understand the impacts of health care
reform.
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Tables and Figures
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Table 1. Summary Statistics
Massachusetts

Health Expenditures
Health Insurance
Expenditures
Prescription Drug
Expenditures
share Health
share Health
Insurance
share Prescription
Drugs
underFPL
Minority
Children
CollegeGrad
Elderly
OwnHome

Pre
(N=1477)
Mean Std. Dev.

Post
(N=1835)
Mean Std. Dev.

Control Group (New York and Maryland)
Pre
Post
(N=4581)
(N=6055)
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.

527.82

810.62

629.88

814.18

531.30

847.87

591.21

810.25

335.22

419.26

419.30

461.10

300.80

435.10

372.00

506.60

61.02

147.10

57.10

155.70

67.40

203.30

62.10

167.40

8.1%

8.7%

8.1%

8.2%

8.1%

8.7%

7.7%

79.8%

5.6%

6.7%

5.8%

6.2%

5.2%

6.1%

5.3%

6.1%

1.2%

2.9%

0.8%

1.8%

1.2%

3.2%

0.9%

2.2%

15.4%
12.6%
34.6%
45.8%
21.5%
68.9%

36.1%
33.2%
47.6%
49.8%
41.1%
46.3%

13.6%
14.1%
31.0%
47.7%
22.7%
69.8%

34.3%
34.8%
46.3%
49.9%
41.9%
45.9%

16.6%
30.7%
28.8%
40.1%
28.8%
69.5%

37.2%
46.1%
45.3%
49.0%
45.3%
46.0%

14.4%
32.2%
28.5%
44.9%
27.9%
66.1%

35.1%
46.7%
45.1%
49.7%
44.8%
47.3%

Source: Author's calculations from Consumer Expenditure Survey, Bureau of Labor Statistics

Table 2. T-test Results
Variable
Total Expenditures
Health Expenditures
Health Insurance Expenditures
Prescription Drug Expenditures

t-test
0.137
0.890
0.008
0.263

Minority
underFPL
Children
CollegeGrad
Elderly
OwnHome

0.000
0.306
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.651

Source: Author's calculations from Consumer Expenditure
Survey, Bureau of Labor Statistics

Table 3. Regressions Results for Health Shares
VARIABLES

MA
Time
Time * MA
UnderFPL
Minority
Children
CollegeGrad
Elderly
OwnHome
UnderFPL * MA
UnderFPL * Time
UnderFPL * MA * Time

Difference-in-differences
(1)
(2)
0.000721
(0.00)
-0.00334*
(0.00)
0.00267
(0.00)

0.00424*
(0.00)
-0.00182
(0.00)
0.000429
(0.00)
0.0117***
(0.00)
-0.0135***
(0.00)
-0.00747***
(0.00)
-0.00686***
(0.00)
0.0673***
(0.00)
0.00469*
(0.00)

(3)

Difference-in-difference-in-differences
(4)
(5)
(6)

0.0012
(0.00)
0.00064
(0.00)
0.00373
(0.00)
0.0447***
(0.00)

0.000375
(0.01)
-0.0208***
(0.01)
-0.0103
(0.01)

0.00479*
(0.00)
0.000385
(0.00)
0.0014
(0.00)
0.0210***
(0.00)
-0.0136***
(0.00)
-0.00731***
(0.00)
-0.00697***
(0.00)
0.0671***
(0.00)
0.00468*
(0.00)
-0.00315
(0.01)
-0.0139***
(0.01)
-0.00853
(0.01)

-0.000365
(0.00)
-0.000635
(0.00)
-0.00121
(0.00)

-0.0145***
(0.00)

0.00474*
(0.00)
-0.000251
(0.00)
-0.00232
(0.00)
0.0117***
(0.00)
-0.0116***
(0.00)
-0.00752***
(0.00)
-0.00692***
(0.00)
0.0673***
(0.00)
0.00464*
(0.00)

VARIABLES

Difference-in-differences

Difference-in-difference-in-differences

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

0.0640***
(0.002)

(5)
-0.0121**
(0.01)
-0.00776**
(0.00)
0.0187**
(0.01)
0.0854***
(0.002)

(6)
-0.00118
(0.01)
-0.00497
(0.00)
0.0133*
(0.01)
0.0649***
(0.002)

0.0809***
(0.001)

0.0654***
(0.002)

0.0735***
(0.001)

13,993
0.118

13,993
0.008

13,993
0.118

Minority * MA
Minority * Time
Minority * MA *Time
Constant

13,993
13,993
13,993
Observations
0
0.117
0.015
R-squared
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: Consumer Expenditure Survey, Bureau of Labor Statistics
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Table 4. Regressions Results for Health Insurance Shares
VARIABLES

MA
Time
Time * MA
UnderFPL
Minority
Children
CollegeGrad
Elderly
OwnHome
UnderFPL * MA
UnderFPL * Time
UnderFPL * MA * Time

Difference-in-differences
(1)
(2)
0.00372*
(0.00)
0.000653
(0.00)
0.00154
(0.00)

0.00741***
(0.00)
0.00192*
(0.00)
-0.000289
(0.00)
0.00840***
(0.00)
-0.00511***
(0.00)
-0.00535***
(0.00)
0.0501***
(0.00)
-0.00842***
(0.00)
0.00515***
(0.00)

(3)

Difference-in-difference-in-differences
(4)
(5)

0.00417**
(0.00)
0.00264**
(0.00)
0.00308
(0.00)
0.0314***
(0.00)

-0.000541
(0.01)
-0.00901**
(0.00)
-0.0129
(0.01)

0.00782***
(0.00)
0.00260**
(0.00)
0.00117
(0.00)
0.0126***
(0.00)
-0.00526***
(0.00)
-0.00530***
(0.00)
0.0499***
(0.00)
-0.00847***
(0.00)
0.00513***
(0.00)
-0.00259
(0.01)
-0.00411
(0.00)
-0.0114
(0.01)

0.00433*
(0.00)
0.00336**
(0.00)
-0.00145
(0.00)

-0.00409**
(0.00)

(6)

0.00833***
(0.00)
0.00392***
(0.00)
-0.00245
(0.00)
0.00841***
(0.00)
-0.00172
(0.00)
-0.00538***
(0.00)
0.0500***
(0.00)
-0.00851***
(0.00)
0.00513***
(0.00)
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VARIABLES

Difference-in-differences

Difference-in-difference-in-differences

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

0.0388***
(0.00)

(5)
-0.0106***
(0.00)
-0.00824***
(0.00)
0.0116**
(0.01)
0.0536***
(0.00)

(6)
-0.0024
(0.00)
-0.00639***
(0.00)
0.0074
(0.01)
0.0384***
(0.00)

0.0523***
(0.00)

0.0394***
(0.00)

0.0471***
(0.00)

13,993
0.172

13,993
0.006

13,993
0.171

Minority * MA
Minority * Time
Minority * MA *Time
Constant

13,993
13,993
13,993
Observations
0.001
0.171
0.023
R-squared
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: Consumer Expenditure Survey, Bureau of Labor Statistics
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Table 5. Regressions Results for Prescription Shares
VARIABLES

MA
Time
Time * MA
UnderFPL
Minority
Children
CollegeGrad
Elderly
OwnHome
UnderFPL * MA
UnderFPL * Time
UnderFPL * MA * Time

Difference-in-differences
(1)
(2)
-0.000257
(0.00)
-0.00363***
(0.00)
-0.00051
(0.00)

0.0004
(0.00)
-0.00329***
(0.00)
-0.000912
(0.00)
0.00445***
(0.00)
-0.00222***
(0.00)
-0.00206***
(0.00)
-0.00262***
(0.00)
0.00995***
(0.00)
0.000228
(0.00)

(3)

Difference-in-difference-in-differences
(4)
(5)

-6.85E-06
(0.00)
-0.00256***
(0.00)
-0.000678
(0.00)
0.0115***
(0.00)

-0.000733
(0.00)
-0.00568***
(0.00)
0.000458
(0.00)

0.000652
(0.00)
-0.00256***
(0.00)
-0.00111
(0.00)
0.00720***
(0.00)
-0.00223***
(0.00)
-0.00201***
(0.00)
-0.00265***
(0.00)
0.00988***
(0.00)
0.000221
(0.00)
-0.00147
(0.00)
-0.00466**
(0.00)
0.00092
(0.00)

0.000104
(0.00)
-0.00369***
(0.00)
-0.00165
(0.00)

-0.00255***
(0.00)

(6)

0.000886
(0.00)
-0.00348***
(0.00)
-0.00190*
(0.00)
0.00444***
(0.00)
-0.00262***
(0.00)
-0.00204***
(0.00)
-0.00259***
(0.00)
0.00997***
(0.00)
0.000202
(0.00)
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VARIABLES

Difference-in-differences

Difference-in-difference-in-differences

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

0.0102***
(0.00)

(5)
-0.00646***
(0.00)
0.000308
(0.00)
0.00914***
(0.00)
0.0128***
(0.00)

(6)
-0.00441***
(0.00)
0.000605
(0.00)
0.00825***
(0.00)
0.0107***
(0.00)

0.0120***
(0.00)

0.0106***
(0.00)

0.0101***
(0.00)

13,993
0.057

13,993
0.02

13,993
0.058

13,993
0.008

13,993
0.058

Minority * MA
Minority * Time
Minority * MA *Time
Constant

13,993
Observations
0.005
R-squared
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Source: Consumer Expenditure Survey, Bureau of Labor Statistics
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X.

Appendix

Difference-in-differences:
(10.1)

(10.2)

(10.3)

(10.4)

(10.5)

(10.6)

Difference-in-difference-in-differences:

(10.7)

(10.8)

(10.9)

(10.10)

(10.11)

(10.12)
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(10.13)

(10.14)

(10.15)

(10.16)

(10.17)

(10.18)
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